The tragedy of the commons (TOC) describes how individuals acting in their own self-interest can deplete commonly-held resources. A recent modeling study has proposed a new approach to couple individual actions to changes in environmental state (Weitz et al., PNAS, 113: E7518). This eco-evolutionary model reveals a novel outcome - an 'oscillatory TOC' - in which the system oscillates between extremal states of cooperation and defection as well as replete and deplete environments.  However, the prior model assumes mean-field dynamics and does not account for population noise and local interactions present in ecological systems. We derived individual-based game rules based on the eco-evolutionary model and implemented them in spatially explicit simulations. We found that spatial interactions lead to an expanded range of game parameters that avert a TOC. In addition, the individual-based, spatially explicit model displays novel, spatiotemporal patterns, including wave fronts and cooperation cluster formation. We identify the conditions underlying collapse and preservation of the commons. Finally, we explain how studying spatial eco-evolutionary models of behavior and resource dynamics may provide insights of mechanisms and conditions under which a TOC can be averted.